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Abstract
A carbon tax is one of the measures used to reduce GHG emissions, as it provides a strong political
instrument for reaching the goal, stated in the Paris Agreement, of limiting the global mean
temperature increase to well below 2 ◦C. While one aspect of a carbon tax is its ability to change
income distribution, no quantitative assessment has been made within the context of global
poverty. Here, we explore future poverty scenarios and show the extent to which carbon tax
revenue, obtained to limit global warming to well below 2 ◦C, has the potential to help eradicate
poverty. In order to better understand the relationship between poverty and climate change
mitigation policy, we developed a novel modelling framework that includes a module representing
poverty indicators in the conventional integrated assessment model. We found that the poverty
gap, which is a measure of the shortfall in income relative to the poverty line, is 84 billion US
dollars (USD) and that the carbon tax revenue potential for the above-mentioned 2 ◦C consistent
climate change mitigation would be 1600 billion USD in 2030. Many low-income countries cannot
fill the poverty gap using only their own domestic revenue; however, this shortfall could be met by
using a portion of the revenue in high-income countries. Our results demonstrate that climate
change mitigation can have a great potential in synergy effects for resolving poverty and illustrates
the importance of international cooperation.
1. Introduction
Currently, the number of people worldwide under
severe poverty, below the threshold for decent liv-
ing ($1.90 per day in terms of international pur-
chasing power parity, PPP), known as the poverty
headcount, is reported as 736 million [1]. The num-
ber has historically decreased, and is now over 1 bil-
lion less than in 1990, despite significant population
increases in low-income countries during this period.
This progress has been driven by strong global income
growth and rising wealth in many low-income coun-
tries. Although a large number of people still suffer
from absolute poverty, poverty reduction has been
very successful over the last couple of decades, as
recognised by the success of the Millennium Devel-
opment Goal (MDG) programme [2]. Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) have been established as
post-MDG UN goals. There are 17 goals and one of
them is SDG1 which clearly states that its goal is to
end poverty. Numerically, the target is ‘to achieve the
target of less than 3% of the world living in extreme
poverty by 2030’. Continuing efforts toward achieve-
ment of SDG1 may lift people out of poverty condi-
tions.
With respect to climate actions, the Paris Agree-
ment [3] defines the long-term international climate
policy goal as: ‘holding the increase in the global
average temperature to well below 2 ◦C above pre-
industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5 ◦C above pre-industrial
levels’. Along with this long-term climate goal, coun-
tries submitted nationally determined contributions
(NDCs), describing their individual near-term
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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actions toward greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
reduction.
Carbon pricing [4, 5], which is often discussed
as an economic measure that will result in reduction
of GHG emissions, would be a key incentive for act-
ors to reduce the CO2 emissions of their activities.
Among carbon pricing measures, a carbon tax is a
useful and efficient economic policy instrument for
reducing GHG emissions, one that has already been
implemented in many countries [5] or is currently
under discussion [6]. A carbon tax could have vari-
ous economic consequences through market mech-
anisms, such as changes to the prices of goods, tax
revenue, and the recycling of such revenue [7].
Considering the potential interactions between
poverty and climate change mitigation, one funda-
mental question is that of whether a carbon tax imple-
mented for climate change mitigation can be used
to reduce poverty [8]. In addition to reducing GHG
additions, carbon tax implementation could be used
to help eradicate poverty by changing income dis-
tribution through revenue recycling. It may be used
to help eradicate poverty. Some previous studies in
the context of climate change impacts on poverty
[9–12] have shown changes in income inequality
associated with climate change mitigation, as well
as in energy poverty, in some countries [13–15].
Moreover, the income equality implications of a
carbon tax have been investigated using national-
scale modelling [16–19]. While there can be another
instrument changing income equality, for example,
using Personal Carbon Trading [20, 21], no study to
date has addressed the use of carbon tax revenue to
poverty globally, despite this topic being highly relev-
ant to international development and climate change
policies.
Here, we show the extent to which carbon tax
revenue could potentially help with poverty eradic-
ation and demonstrate the importance of interna-
tional cooperation in meeting that goal. A scenario
analysis is undertaken that explores the potential car-
bon tax revenues that could be derived under the cli-
mate mitigation goals stated in the Paris Agreement
and estimate and estimate the poverty headcount and
poverty gap, which represents the deficit of income
below the poverty line, for around 200 countries (sup-
plementary tables 1 and 2). We also derived the abso-
lute poverty gap and the poverty gap as a portion of
GDP for comparisons with carbon tax revenue.
2. Materials andmethods
We used a state-of-the-art integrated assessment
modelling framework, the Asia-Pacific integ-
rated model (AIM) [22, 23] (supplementary
figure 1) (available online at https://stacks.iop.
org/ERL/15/114063/mmedia). The AIM has been
applied for the global and national climate change
mitigation assessment, and the core of the framework
is built upon a computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model that represents all goods and services
transactions within the economic system. The cli-
mate policy is represented by imposing carbon tax,
which is endogenously determined to meet the emis-
sions constraints, and carbon tax is collected from
industrial and household activities emitting GHG
gases, and then its revenue is recycled to the house-
hold. In reality, carbon pricing and carbon taxes may
not operate this effectively, but the methodology is
thought to offer a suitable simplification of these
mechanisms. Within this CGE model, macroeco-
nomic indicators and those associated with energy,
agriculture, land use are, and GHG emissions are
computed. In this study, we also developed a new
sub-model enabling the simulation of income distri-
bution and consumption patterns of households so
that individual income class income and expenditure
patterns are representedwithin themodel because the
CGE model classifies only single represented house-
holds for each region. Accordingly, this sub-model
consists of income and expenditure modules. The
former estimates the income distribution using thou-
sands of income segments, while the latter computes
changes in the consumption pattern associated with
price changes, given the income for each segment.
The primary analysis was conducted using a poverty
line of $1.90 a day (2011 PPP), which is widely used
in international contexts [1]. The macroeconomic
indicators (regional average income loss rates), and
price indices computed by the CGE model are fed
into the poverty module (see supplementary note 1).
We developed scenarios based on various climate
policies being implemented by 2050, mainly focus-
ing on the year 2030, which is the target year of cur-
rent international near-term climate policy decisions
associated with the Paris Agreement. We analysed
four scenarios: baseline, NDC, well below 2 ◦C, and
1.5 ◦C (hereafter WB2C and 1.5 C). Baseline reflects
the historical trend up to 2015, extended without
additional climate policy. NDC assumes that each
nation’s emissions are in line with the NDC submit-
ted to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change for the Paris Agreement by that
nation. The WB2C and 1.5 C scenarios are consistent
with changes of 2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C, respectively, assum-
ing a globally uniform carbon price and implying
that all countries participate in emissions reduction
efforts with cost-efficientmechanisms. The emissions
under both scenarios are consistent with the recent
IPCC report [24]. We adopted the shared socioeco-
nomic pathways (SSPs) assumptions as a background
for socioeconomic dynamics [25]. The middle-of-
the-road scenario, SSP2, is the default scenario used
in this study, and sensitivity analysis under varying
socioeconomic assumptions was carried out. Carbon
tax revenue was calculated from the residual CO2
emissions and carbon tax rates (for more details, see
Supplementary Note 1).
2
Environ. Res. Lett. 15 (2020) 114063 S Fujimori et al
Figure 1. Global and regional trends in socioeconomic indicators and income distribution. Panels (a)–(g) indicate population,
GDP per capita, Gini coefficient, poverty headcount, poverty headcount ratio, and poverty gap rate based on a threshold of
$1.9/day per capita, respectively. Panel d shows the income distribution under $5000 per capita. Panels (h) and (i) illustrate the
population under the poverty line and poverty rate, which is the population ratio under the poverty line, of each country in 2030.
3. Results
3.1. Exploring poverty toward 2030
The global poverty headcount is projected to decrease
continuously over the coming decades, from 736mil-
lion in 2015 to 360 million in 2030 and 91 million in
2050 (figure 1(e)). The socioeconomic assumptions
behind our estimates drive these trends, as they indic-
ate steady income growth (figure 1(b)) and popula-
tion increase (figure 1(a)), as well as stable income
equality within countries, represented by the Gini
coefficient (figure 1(c)). The poverty rate is projec-
ted to reach 4.3% after falling from 9.9% in 2015,
nearly reaching the goal stated in the SDGs. Along
with macro-level socioeconomic dynamics, such as
mean GDP per capita and the Gini coefficient, the
global income distribution is predicted to shift such
that the peak of income becomes lower and moves to
the right in the incomedistribution figure (figure 1(d)
and see supplementary figure 2 for regional results).
The poverty gap shows a similar decreasing trend
to the poverty headcount, falling from 4% in 2015 to
1.4% in 2030 (figure 1(g)) (a discussion of the small
gaps between the historical record andpredicted scen-
ario can be found in the Methods and Supplement-
ary Information). The absolute poverty gap is projec-
ted to be $82 billion by 2030 (2011 international PPP)
(hereafter, $ indicates 2011 international PPP), which
is equivalent to 0.042% of total global GDP, and it
looks likely to approach zero in 2050.
The poverty rates and population under the
poverty line vary among countries (figures 1(h) and
(i)). Currently, the least developed countries, which
are mainly located in the African continent, are likely
continue to host relatively large populations under
extreme poverty (figure 1(i)). For instance, we found
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Figure 2. Climate change mitigation effects on poverty. (a)–(d) present global CO2 emissions, carbon price, GDP loss rate, and
carbon tax revenue relative to GDP, respectively. Panel (e) shows global mean price changes under the mitigation scenarios
relative to the baseline level in 2030 and 2050. Panel (f) indicates poverty-related index changes under all scenarios (poverty gap,
poverty headcount and poverty rate). Panels (g) and (h) illustrate carbon tax revenue and poverty gap relative to GDP,
respectively, of all countries in comparison with the GDP per capita under each mitigation scenario (shown with a log scale).
that Somalia, Central African Republic andMadagas-
car are the countries with the highest poverty rates,
which are projected to be 0.77, 0.63 and 0.52, respect-
ively, in our scenario in 2030. Meanwhile, the popu-
lation living under the poverty line is remarkable in
Nigeria, India, and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. These countries will have 79, 60 and 28 mil-
lion people living in poverty in 2030, respectively,
which are larger numbers than in other countries;
however, the corresponding poverty rates of 0.31%,
0.040% and 0.23% are not among the highest values
(figure 1(h)).
3.2. Carbon tax revenue and effects of climate
change mitigation
Stronger climate mitigation measures require reduc-
tions in emission levels (figure 2(a)), which can
be achieved using higher carbon taxes (prices)
(figure 2(b)). Likewise, tax revenues–derived by
multiplying total emissions by tax level–are higher
under more stringent climate litigation levels and
are expected to peak around the year 2030. Levels
are likely to decline after this as a result of lowering
emissions and moderate increases in carbon price.
The carbon tax revenue is derived from multiply-
ing emissions by tax level and increases as a result
of increases in the climate change mitigation policy
(figure 2(c)). The global total carbon tax revenue
potential is projected to be $436 billion in 2030 under
the NDC scenario, whereas the 1.5 C and WB2C
climate change mitigation scenarios lead to reven-
ues of $1360 and $1210 billion, which are 2.0% and
2.3% of GDP respectively in 2030. The carbon price
rises to around $50 under the 1.5 C and WB2C
scenarios, which leads to differences in carbon tax
revenue.
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Figure 3. Distribution of carbon tax revenue and the poverty gap by nation in 2030 under the WB2C scenario. Panels (a)–(c)
present carbon tax revenue relative to GDP, poverty gap relative to GDP and the difference between carbon tax revenue and the
poverty gap relative to GDP, respectively. Panel (d) shows the difference (in absolute terms) between carbon tax revenue and the
poverty gap. Panel (e) illustrates global carbon tax revenue and poverty gaps in five major regions. Panels (f) and (g) show the 20
countries with the greatest poverty gaps and carbon tax revenues under the WB2C scenario, respectively. Panel (h) presents the 20
countries with the greatest poverty gap relative to GDP along with carbon tax revenue relative to GDP.
In addition to carbon tax revenue, carbon pricing
has certain adverse side effects in terms of macroe-
conomic factors and household consumption. The
global income loss associated with additional climate
change mitigation costs could reach 2.0% in 2030
under the WB2C scenario and 1.5 C scenario shows
similar trend by 2030 (figure 2(d)). Prices of goods, in
particular energy and food, showed increases of 7.5%
and 4.4%, respectively, which could have regress-
ive effects on consumption levels of low-income
households (figure 2(e)). The ultimate consequences
of these price and income changes associated with
climate mitigation scenarios basically cause adverse
side effects in poverty headcount, poverty gap, and
poverty rates similarly. As the stronger the climate
mitigation increases, the magnitude of the above-
mentioned side effects gets larger. Taking an example
of the WB2C scenario, poverty gap would increase by
23% compared with Baseline scenario (figure 2(f)).
The poverty gap shifts from a baseline of 1.4% to
1.6% under WB2C. This number might appear large,
but is small compared with the other uncertainties
described below (e.g. socioeconomic uncertainty).
Note that the ratio of the poverty gap to GDP for
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Figure 4. Uncertainties in global carbon tax revenue and the poverty gap associated with socioeconomic assumptions, stringency
of climate policies, gas coverage of the carbon tax and the poverty threshold. Panels (a) and (b) present carbon tax revenue
relative to GDP and poverty gap relative to GDP and are grouped by gas coverage of the carbon tax and poverty threshold. Panel
(c) shows the ratios of carbon tax revenue to poverty gap for each case. The bar indicates the default socioeconomic condition
represented by SSP2 and dots indicate the variations under SSP1 and SSP3.
each nation is not so much affected by the stringency
of climate change mitigation (figure 2(h)). Import-
antly, the damage caused by climate change to the
low-income class would bemuch larger than the aver-
age GDP changes and, thus, would be of more serious
concern than the effects of climate change mitigation
on poverty [9].
We compared global carbon tax revenue with the
poverty gap for all countries (figures 3(a)–(d)). The
poverty gap varies geographically among countries
both in absolute and per GDP terms (figures 3(b) and
(c)). This result is easily explained because the poverty
gap measures the level of absolute poverty, which
should be concentrated on low-income countries.
However, carbon tax revenue is more equally distrib-
uted among countries in per GDP terms (figure 3(a)).
Basically, all nations, including high-income nations
emit a certain level of GHGs and the imposition of
the same carbon tax level across counties would yield
relatively equal distribution. It is also worth noting
that the carbon tax revenue per GDP in all nations
is less than 0.1. Subtracting the poverty gap from
carbon tax revenue, we can derive shortages of car-
bon tax revenue, which occurs in some African coun-
tries, such as Nigeria and the Central African Repub-
lic (figure 3(f)). Eventually, for the global aggregates,
we found that the poverty gap is 15 times larger
than the carbon tax revenue (figure 3(e)). Carbon
tax revenue potential is distributed among countries
(figure 3(a)), but is greater in countries with a large
population of middle income earners such as China
and India ($240, $80 billion, respectively) and in
countries with relatively large OECD economies such
as the United States and Japan ($190 and $50 billion).
Importantly, the heterogeneity of carbon tax revenue
relative to GDP among countries is much smaller
than that of the poverty gap. The 20 countries with
the greatest poverty gaps are generally short of car-
bon tax revenue because these countries emit relat-
ively less GHG emissions, leading small carbon mar-
kets (figures 3(g) and (h)). The degree of this short-
age is incredibly small compared with the surpluses of
carbon tax revenue predicted, mainly in high-income
countries. For example, 20% of the carbon tax rev-
enue in developed countries (current OECD + EU),
which is around 0.1% of GDP, could be used to sup-
plement the poverty gap. We observed high similarity
throughout the geographical distribution of the dif-
ference between projected revenue and the poverty
gap in the 1.5 C scenario, while carbon tax revenue
was more concentrated in OECD countries in the
NDC scenario (supplementary figure 7).
3.3. Uncertainty analysis
The results presented above may vary with 1) the
stringency of climate change mitigation, 2) socioeco-
nomic assumptions such as population changes and
economic development, 3) the poverty line, and 4)
the GHG coverage of the carbon tax imposed. Three
additional sensitivity analysis shown below were car-
ried out to test these uncertainties (climate policy
variations have already been computed above).
• Three socioeconomic assumptions represented by
SSPs (SSP1: sustainable and high growth in devel-
oping countries, SSP2: middle-of-the-road scen-
ario, SSP3: low growth and high population in
developing countries)
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• Additional poverty lines of $3.2 and $5.5/day per
capita
• Carbon taxes covering all gases stated in the Kyoto
Protocol, CO2 only and energy-related CO2 only.
Almost all cases show carbon tax revenue that is
greater than the poverty gap (figure 4). In particular,
under the $1.9/day per capita poverty threshold, we
confirmed the robustness of our findings under all
assumptions (figure 4(c) left). Under climate policy
in line with 2 ◦C or 1.5 ◦C stabilisation, even with
a poverty line of $3.2/day per capita, carbon tax rev-
enue is sufficient to cover the poverty gap (figure 4(c)
left). However, to fill the poverty gap at the $5.5/day
per capita threshold requires a much larger amount
of money, which would no longer be covered by
the carbon tax revenue. Socioeconomic uncertainty
affects the amounts of both carbon tax revenue and
the poverty gap. Interestingly, both indicators var-
ied in the same direction, with carbon tax rev-
enue and the poverty gap following the pattern of
SSP3 > SSP2 > SSP1, causing the uncertainty range
for the ratio of carbon tax revenue to poverty associ-
ated with socioeconomic assumptions to be small. In
SSP3, the carbon prices become higher than in other
scenarios due to the high challenges in mitigation,
which leads to larger carbon taxes. Finally, carbon tax
coverage was not an influential factor in this assess-
ment, although its coverage may be controversial due
to food security concerns [26, 27]. Regional results are
provided in supplementary figure 8.
4. Discussion and conclusions
We found that carbon tax revenue has a great poten-
tial to help eradicate poverty, and our findings
provide critical information for international climate
change and sustainable development policy. In many
countries, a carbon tax is currently being considered
to reduce GHG emissions, but how the tax revenue
should be used remains under debate. Our findings
provide meaningful insights that may contribute to
the formulation of domestic policies in numerous
nations.
Another important implication of this study is
that international cooperation is essential to filling the
poverty gap, as carbon tax revenue is received primar-
ily by high-income countries (e.g. the United States,
Japan and Germany) and emerging countries (e.g.
China and India). A small fraction of the carbon tax
revenues of high-income countries could be used to
fill the overall global poverty gap.
Clarifying the scale of the global poverty gap and
carbon tax revenue through comparison with cur-
rently approved climate funding is also informat-
ive. At conferences of the parties 17 which was held
in Durban, the parties set up the Green Climate
Fund (GCF) as an operating entity of the Financial
Mechanism of the Convention, in accordance with
Article 11 of the Paris Agreement. The agreement sets
a new collective quantified goal with a floor of $100
billion per year, accounting for the needs and prior-
ities of developing countries. The scale of the poverty
gap is comparable with the size of this GCF while the
GCF is still struggling with collectingmoney (e.g. due
to the withdrawal of United States) and currently it
was around 10 billion$ in 2019. From the perspect-
ive of development policies, global net official devel-
opment assistance (ODA) was $133 billion (0.3% of
GNI) in 2015 [28], which is comparable to the poverty
gap and much smaller than projected carbon tax rev-
enue. Another way to interpret the level of aid is based
on SDG 17 (partnership), which sets a target ODA
level of 0.7% of ODA/GNI (gross national income). If
the carbon tax revenue transfer to developing coun-
tries suggested in this study were to be added to the
current ODA totals, SDG 17 would be more easily
achieved. As past emissions have predominantly ori-
ginated from developed countries, such transfers are
thought to be justifiable.
Several possible arguments with our conclusions
are discussed below. As shown in figure 3, large
amounts of carbon tax revenue will be collected not
only in the current group of developed countries
but also in middle-income countries (e.g. China and
India) and wealthy countries in the middle East (e.g.
Saudi Arabia). Given the current complexity of inter-
national affairs, reaching a single international agree-
ment would be difficult. Therefore, we show the
potential of carbon tax revenue for poverty eradic-
ation, and note that actual political implementation
depends on numerous considerations. At the same
time, we believe that this study offers a foundation to
start that discussion.
Obviously, we cannot use carbon tax revenue only
for reduction of income inequality or poverty eradic-
ation. As shown in previous studies [5], carbon tax
revenue already supports multiple functions in coun-
tries that have implemented such a tax, such as sub-
sidising renewable energy generation. Thus, a dir-
ect comparison of total carbon tax revenue with the
poverty gapmay not fairly represent reality. However,
even one tenth of the carbon tax revenue estimated in
this study is sufficient to fill the poverty gap under the
1.5 C and WB2C scenarios, supporting the import-
ance of international cooperation in this area.
A globally uniform carbon tax rate (per ton of
CO2) may not be a realistic assumption which is
assumed in the 1.5 C and WB2C scenarios as well
as in many global studies [4]. Firstly, although many
countries have already implemented carbon taxes, its
usage is still limited and collection of carbon taxes,
particularly from the least developed countries, will
remain difficult in the near future. Secondly, car-
bon tax levels currently vary among countries, from
a few dollars to around a hundred dollars per ton
of CO2 [5]. To achieve uniform global carbon pri-
cing would require a well-established global carbon
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market or equivalent institution. Such a market or
market mechanismmust be beneficial to many actors
around the world, but this is not be easily achieved.
However, as we have demonstrated, carbon tax rev-
enue in the major emitting countries, i.e. high- and
middle-income countries, would be sufficient to fill
the poverty gap. Thus, the more important topic of
discussion is how to use carbon tax revenue from
relatively high-income countries rather than how to
implement a carbon tax in low-income countries.
There is opposition to carbon tax even in high-
incomenations,mainly driven by low-incomepeople.
Also, low-income nations could face much stronger
resistance than high-income nations. Thus, the real
applicability of carbon tax would be another key dis-
cussion point, and the multiple instruments would
be better to be considered in reality (PCT and ETS).
However, to achieve the long-term climate goal, every
nation somehow needs to reduce emissions and car-
bon tax would be a secure option in the future.
This analysis is based on the assumption that
carbon tax revenue goes directly to people living in
poverty. This may be possible in some countries, but
we cannot expect that governments can easily distrib-
ute carbon tax revenue, collected either domestically
or from abroad, to the poorest people. Moreover, dir-
ectly giving money to those in poverty may not be an
appropriate development policy. Poverty should be
addressed as a multi-dimensional condition [29, 30],
where education, access to clean water and energy,
and many other social aspects are considered, and
cannot be resolved by a simple transfer of money.
The cost of poverty eradication would be much
higher than a subsidy directly to low-income people.
More importantly, development policy should aim
to have long-term effects, such as increasing human
capacity and developing social infrastructure. For
instance, the estimated costs of education, health
and social protection transfers would be $2.4 trillion
per year[31]. Accordingly, the plan to help eradic-
ate poverty should include various instruments, both
directly and indirectly.
The distributional effects of a carbon tax are con-
troversial [32, 33]. The literature about national-scale
assessments is relatively wide ranging and the con-
clusions to date tend to vary depending on indi-
vidual nations and on the assumptions of each study.
Three main mechanisms affect how a carbon tax
changes household income (consumption), namely,
the income source, direct and indirect expenditure
effects, and carbon tax recycling schemes. This paper
does not aim to address these points, but they are a
relevant topic for future research using the methodo-
logy developed in this study, and may be discussed in
forthcoming studies.
Although we consider the overall conclusions of
our study to be robust, there are several aspects for
which slight differences are expected. For example, we
estimated income and consumption by each segment
based on a one-way coupling model that uses a
CGEmodel to compute themacroeconomic response
which is then passed to a poverty model to account
for effects on income distribution and household
expenditure. Certain feedback effects are expected
from the income distribution to macroeconomic
factors, and identifying these effects is the next chal-
lenge. The household survey data are another source
of uncertainty, as data quality from such surveys may
be poor. As such, we must acknowledge that our
methodology relies on uncertain data. These things
can be addressed by future researches bymaking addi-
tional model tests and data updates. While we need
further investigations, the findings of this study can
stimulate a debate on the poverty and climate change
mitigation policies, and the methodology would be a
milestone for a new research area.
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